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(HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESS ABOUT HER GANG AFFILIATION, GANG MEMBERSHIP HAD NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHARGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in affirming defendant’s conviction, noted that it was error to allow the prosecutor to cross-examine a defense witness about the witness’s gang affiliation. Gang membership had no relationship to the charges:

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The Supreme Court erred in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine a defense witness regarding her possible gang affiliations since there was no connection between gang membership and the alleged crime … . It was also improper to allow the prosecutor to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach that witness’s credibility when she denied being affiliated with a gang … . However, because there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and no significant probability that these errors contributed to the defendant’s convictions, the errors were harmless … . People v Chinloy, 2017 NY Slip Op 06450, Second Dept 9-13-17

CRIMINAL LAW ((HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESS ABOUT HER GANG AFFILIATION, GANG MEMBERSHIP HAD NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESS ABOUT HER GANG AFFILIATION, GANG MEMBERSHIP HAD NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))/GANGS (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESS ABOUT HER GANG AFFILIATION, GANG MEMBERSHIP HAD NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))

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