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USE OF SIGNERS’ POST OFFICE BOX ADDRESSES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PROPER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the use of the signers’ post office box addresses on the designating petition was proper and did not warrant invalidation:

A candidate’s designating petition must set forth “the name of the signer, his or her residence address, town or city (except in the city of New York, the county), and the date when the signature is affixed” (Election Law § 6-130 … ; see Election Law § 6-140[1][a]). Pursuant to the Election Law, “residence” shall be deemed to mean “that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home and to which he, wherever temporarily located, always intends to return,” but does not specify the manner in which such address shall be recorded, except that customary abbreviations may be used (Election Law § 1-104[22]; see Election Law § 6-134[5]). However, the Election Law also provides that “[a] signature on a petition sheet shall not be deemed invalid solely because the address provided is the post office address of the signer provided that proof that such address is the accepted address of such signer is provided to the board of elections no later than three days following the receipt of specific objections to such signature” (Election Law § 6-134[12]). In addition, the Election Law specifies that a voter’s registration record shall include, inter alia, both “[t]he residence address at which the voter claims to reside and post office address, if not the same” and “[t]he assembly district or ward and the election district in which such residence address is located” (Election Law § 5-500[4][d], [e]).

Here, the signers listed their post office addresses, which are the same addresses utilized by the BOE [Board of Elections] for mailing purposes. Further, the “walk lists” provided for the candidates’ use in canvassing contain those address designations. The BOE asserts that its records also contain a five-digit code identifying the town, ward, and district for each address and that the codes for the addresses in question indicate that, for polling purposes, the addresses at issue lie within the Town of Harrison. The designating petition sets forth “the signer[‘s]” residence addresses, within the geographical boundaries of the Town of Harrison. Thus, under the particular circumstances of this case, the BOE should not have sustained the objections to the signatures at issue … . Matter of Giordano v Westchester County Bd. of Elections, 2017 NY Slip Op 06272, Second Dept 8-23-17

 

ELECTION LAW (USE OF SIGNERS’ POST OFFICE BOX ADDRESSES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PROPER (SECOND DEPT))/DESIGNATING PETITIONS (ELECTION LAW, USE OF SIGNERS’ POST OFFICE BOX ADDRESSES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PROPER (SECOND DEPT))

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