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COUNTY LAW 308 DOES NOT PROHIBIT DISCOVERY OF 911 CALL RECORDS IN A CIVIL LAWSUIT, INCLUDING THE RECORDS OF 911 CALLS MADE BY NONPARTIES.

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice DeMoyer, determined Supreme Court properly ordered the county to provide to plaintiff records of 911 calls made during a severe winter storm. Plaintiff’s decedent was stranded in his car during the storm and called 911 for help. Help did not arrive until nearly 24 hours later, after plaintiff’s decedent died. In addition to the records of plaintiff’s decedent’s 911 call (which the county provided), plaintiff sought records of 911 calls made by others during the storm. The county argued the list of parties allowed access to 911 call records in County Law § 308 (4) was exclusive, and did not include parties in civil lawsuits. The Fourth Department determined the county’s argument was not supported by the legislative history of the statute:

Here, the context and legislative history of section 308 (4) paint a different picture than defendants’ de-contextualized analysis suggests. Section 308 was enacted as part of article 6 of the County Law, which contains 59 discrete provisions related almost exclusively to the financing of a uniform, statewide telephonic emergency response system. * * *

… County Law § 300 reveals unmistakably that the Legislature was motivated to adopt County Law article 6 in order to update the emergency response system across the State and to mitigate the financial burden of that endeavor for local governments. It is hardly surprising, then, that section 308 (4) lacks the hallmark language of other statutory provisions which specifically cut off a civil litigant’s access to certain classes of evidentiary materials for reasons of public policy… .

The relevant legislative history lends further support to our conclusion that the Legislature did not enact section 308 (4) in order to exempt 911 records from the scope of discovery authorized by CPLR article 31. Specifically, the sponsoring memorandum for what would become County Law article 6 referenced only the budgetary implications of enhanced 911 services for local government … , and a later-introduced bill sought to repeal section 308 (4) on the ground that it unjustifiably shielded 911 records from requests under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) … . Tellingly, the sponsor … did not identify any need to repeal section 308 (4) in order to make 911 records discoverable under article 31, and for good reason — section 308 (4) had never exempted 911 records from such disclosure in the first place. Abate v County of Erie, 2017 NY Slip Op 05351, 4th Dept 6-30-17

 

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