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THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CAN BE APPLIED TO BYPASS THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IF THE RESULT OF ENFORCING THE STATUTE WOULD BE UNCONSCIONABLE, THE RESULT HERE WAS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE. ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a dissent (raising a different issue), agreeing with the Third Department, held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be applied to bypass the Statute of Frauds if enforcing the Statute of Frauds would lead to an unconscionable result. Here, however, disagreeing with the Third Department, the Court of Appeals found that enforcement of the Statute of Frauds would not lead to an unconscionable result. The case involved devised property with a mortgage on it. The decedent, in an earlier will, provided that the mortgage should be paid off with estate funds. However, that provisions was not included in a subsequent will. The petitioners sought to enforce an oral agreement to pay off the mortgage. Because the value of the property was about three times the amount of the mortgage, the Court of Appeals reasoned the result was not unconscionable and the Statute of Frauds should be enforced:

“The Statute of Frauds was designed to guard against the peril of perjury; to prevent the enforcement of unfounded fraudulent claims. But, as Professor Williston observed: ‘The Statute of Frauds was not enacted to afford persons a means of evading just obligations; nor was it intended to supply a cloak of immunity to hedging litigants lacking integrity; nor was it adopted to enable defendants to interpose the Statute as a bar to a contract fairly, and admittedly, made'” … ,

In other words, equity “will not permit the statute of frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud” … .

We hold that where the elements of promissory estoppel are established, and the injury to the party who acted in reliance on the oral promise is so great that enforcement of the statute of frauds would be unconscionable, the promisor should be estopped from reliance on the statute of frauds. * * *

The standard for unconscionability where one party is seeking to avoid the statute of frauds must be equally demanding, lest the statute of frauds be rendered a nullity. …

“The strongly held public policy reflected in New York’s Statute of Frauds would be severely undermined if a party could be estopped from asserting it every time a court found that some unfairness would otherwise result. For this reason, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is properly reserved for that limited class of cases where the circumstances are such as to render it unconscionable to deny the promise upon which the plaintiff has relied” … . Matter of Hennel, 2017 NY Slip Op 05266, CtApp 6-29-17

 

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