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MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN TWO WEEKS AFTER THE ACCIDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED, CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS FOR WORK ON THE AREA OF THE FALL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED, SUBPOENAS FOR WITNESSES WHO HAD NOT BEEN DEPOSED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUASHED.

The First Department determined the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. The First Department further held that photographs of the sinkhole where plaintiff fell (taken two weeks after the injury) and the contract specifications for repair of the sinkhole should not have been excluded from evidence. In addition plaintiff’s subpoenas for a city inspector and a principal of the contractor (Halcyon) which repaired the sinkhole should not have been quashed. The fact that those witnesses were not deposed did not preclude plaintiff’s calling them at trial:

… [T]he trial court erred in precluding pictures of the accident site … . Plaintiff authenticated the photographs at his deposition, and further testimony at trial could have explained how and why the scene depicted in the photos did or did not differed from the scene on the day of the accident … . Exclusion of the photographs meant that plaintiff was unable to show the jury the hole into which he allegedly fell.

Nor should the court have precluded the City’s specifications incorporated into its contract with Halcyon. The specifications were expressly incorporated into the contract between Halcyon and the City; thus, they applied not only to the City itself, but also to third parties. Therefore, they were admissible as potential evidence of defendants’ negligence… , and indeed, the City failed to show how the specifications transcended the duty of reasonable care. The trial court’s exclusion of this evidence regarding the specifications hobbled plaintiff’s ability to prove that the City had engaged in affirmative negligence — the very basis upon which the trial court granted the directed verdict.

Likewise, the court erred in quashing the subpoenas directed to the City’s onsite inspector and a principal of Halcyon … . Although plaintiff did not formally name the City’s onsite inspector and the principal of Halcyon as witnesses, nothing in the CPLR requires a party to generate a trial witness list, nor does the record indicate that the individual court rules required him to do so … . Indeed, there is no requirement that a party depose a witness in order to call him or her as a witness at trial. Gonzalez v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 05180, 1st Dept 6-27-17

 

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