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POST-DEATH INTEREST ON AN ANNUITY SHOULD NOT BE CALCULATED BY APPLYING THE INTEREST RATE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT TO THE ENTIRE PERIOD BETWEEN THE DEATH OF THE ANNUITANT (1998) AND THE DATE OF PAYMENT (2012).

The Second Department interpreted an ambiguous term in an Insurance Law statute to determine the appropriate post-death interest to be paid on an annuity. The interest rate at the time of payment should not be applied to entire period between the death of the annuitant (1998) and the date of payment (2012). Rather, the historical interest rates during that time should be applied:

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On or about November 8, 2012, TFLIC [defendant insurer] sent the plaintiff a check for $142,163.54, representing the value of Annuity #8231 on the date of … death ($132,071.06), plus $10,092.48 in interest, calculated at an annual rate of 0.5%. The estate accepted the payment “without waiving any rights that [the plaintiff] may have to interest since the date of death, costs and expenses resulting from your failure to provide this annuity upon the decedent’s death.” The estate later commenced this action against the defendants alleging, inter alia, breach of contract for the delay in paying the proceeds of Annuity #8231, and demanding, inter alia, prejudgment interest at the legal rate of 9% (see CPLR 5004). …

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… [T]he calculation of interest on the proceeds due under Annuity #8231 must be determined in accordance with the principles set forth in Insurance Law § 3214, which applies specifically to interest paid on the proceeds of an annuity following the death of the annuitant. …

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The Supreme Court erred … in determining that the rate of interest due on the proceeds of Annuity #8231 pursuant to Insurance Law § 3214(c) should be determined solely by reference to the rate in effect at the time of payment—in this case, 0.5%.

Insurance Law § 3214(c), entitled “Interest upon proceeds of life insurance policies and annuity contracts,” provides, in relevant part, that, “interest upon the principal sum paid to the beneficiary . . . shall be computed daily at the rate of interest currently paid by the insurer on proceeds left under the interest settlement option, from the date of the death of an . . . annuitant in connection with a death claim on such a . . . contract of annuity . . . to the date of payment and shall be added to and be a part of the total sum paid.” … [T]he word “currently” is ambiguous, as it could refer to the rate in effect on each date on which a daily computation must be made. Conversely, it could refer to the rate in effect on the date of payment.

” Where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, the courts will adopt that which avoids injustice, hardship, constitutional doubts or other objectionable results'”… . Applying this principle here, the calculation of interest under section 3214(c) should reflect the rates applied by the insurer in the normal course of managing its funds held on deposit, rather than arbitrarily determining the entire interest payment based on the happenstance of the interest rate in effect on the date of payment … . …

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Accordingly, summary judgment should have been denied to both parties in this case, as the record presents unresolved issues of fact regarding the historical interest rates used by TFLIC and its predecessor, TLICNY, between 1998 (the year of …. death) and 2012 (the year on which the proceeds of Annuity #8231 were paid). Fleischman v Transamerica Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 05068, 2nd Dept 6-21-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (ANNUITIES, INTEREST ON AN ANNUITY SHOULD NOT BE CALCULATED BY APPLYING THE INTEREST RATE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT TO THE ENTIRE PERIOD BETWEEN THE DEATH OF THE ANNUITANT (1998) AND THE DATE OF PAYMENT (2012))/ANNUITIES (INSURANCE LAW, INTEREST, INTEREST ON AN ANNUITY SHOULD NOT BE CALCULATED BY APPLYING THE INTEREST RATE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT TO THE LIFE OF THE ANNUITY)/INTEREST (ANNUITIES, INSURANCE LAW, INTEREST ON AN ANNUITY SHOULD NOT BE CALCULATED BY APPLYING THE INTEREST RATE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT TO THE ENTIRE PERIOD BETWEEN THE DEATH OF THE ANNUITANT (1998) AND THE DATE OF PAYMENT (2012)))

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