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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RENUNCIATION OF INHERITANCE WAS INVALID.

The Second Department determined Surrogate’s Court should not have granted the administrator’s (decedent’s father’s) motion for summary judgment dismissing the objections of the decedent’s niece and nephew (objectants) on the ground the niece and nephew did not have standing. Initially decedent’s father, who was entitled to inherit all of decedent’s estate, renounced his inheritance. He then argued the renunciation was invalid and summary judgment was granted in his favor on that ground. The Second Department held there was a question of fact whether the renunciation was invalid:

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Surrogate’s Court erred in granting the petitioner’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the objections at issue based on a finding that the objectants lacked standing to challenge the accounting. Where, as here, a decedent who died intestate was survived by a parent but no spouse and no issue, the whole of the decedent’s estate would be distributed to the surviving parent pursuant to EPTL 4-1.1(a)(4). In that event, the objectants, who would not be distributees, would lack standing as persons interested in the estate … . However, EPTL 2-1.11(c)(1) provides, in part, that any beneficiary of a disposition “may renounce all or part of such beneficiary’s interest.” Further, EPTL 2-1.11(g) provides that “[a] renunciation may not be made under this section with respect to any property which a renouncing person has accepted . . . For purposes of this paragraph, a person accepts an interest in property if such person voluntarily transfers or encumbers, or contracts to transfer or encumber all or part of such interest, or accepts delivery or payment of, or exercises control as beneficial owner over all or part thereof, or executes a written waiver of the right to renounce, or otherwise indicates [an] acceptance of all or part of such interest.” Here, the petitioner failed to establish, prima facie, that his renunciation of his interest in the estate was invalid, resulting in him being the sole distributee and the objectants lacking standing as not being persons interested in the estate. The petitioner adduced no evidence to demonstrate that he accepted an interest in the estate by exercising control over it as its beneficial owner prior to his irrevocable renunciation of his interest pursuant to EPTL 2-1.11. Matter of Kaplan, 2017 NY Slip Op 03750, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (RENUNCIATION, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RENUNCIATION OF INHERITANCE WAS INVALID)/RENUNCIATION (INHERITANCE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RENUNCIATION OF INHERITANCE WAS INVALID)/INHERITANCE (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, RENUNCIATION,  QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RENUNCIATION OF INHERITANCE WAS INVALID)

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