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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LEAD PAINT POISONING CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Fourth Department determined the landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this lead paint poisoning case should not have been granted:

“In order [t]o establish that a landlord is liable for a lead-paint condition, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of, and a reasonable opportunity to remedy, the hazardous condition’ ” … . Where, as here, there is no evidence that the landlord had actual notice, plaintiffs may establish that the landlord had constructive notice of such condition by demonstrating that the landlord “(1) retained a right of entry to the premises and assumed a duty to make repairs, (2) knew that the apartment was constructed at a time before lead-based interior paint was banned, (3) was aware that paint was peeling on the premises, (4) knew of the hazards of lead-based paint to young children and (5) knew that a young child lived in the apartment” … .  Here, it is undisputed that decedent retained a right of entry and assumed a duty to make repairs, but the remaining … factors are in dispute.

By submitting the deposition testimony of plaintiffs’ mother, wherein she testified that she told [defendant] that she would be living at the residence with her young children, [defendants] raised a triable issue of fact on the fifth … factor. Similarly, [defendant’s] own deposition testimony raised a triable issue of fact on the second … factor inasmuch as he testified that the subject residence was old, that lead was taken out of gasoline in 1970, and he “must have known” that laws regarding lead started to come out in the 1970s ,,, . Even assuming, arguendo, that [defendants] met their initial burden on the third and fourth … factors, we conclude that plaintiffs raised triable issues of fact by submitting ” evidence from which it may be inferred that [defendant] knew that paint was peeling on the premises’ . . . , and evidence from which a jury could infer that [defendant] knew or should have known of the dangers of lead paint to children’ ” … . Rodrigues v Lesser, 2017 NY Slip Op 03669, 4th Dept 5-5-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LEAD PAINT POISONING CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/TOXIC TORTS (LEAD PAINT, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LEAD PAINT POISONING CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/LEAD PAINT (DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LEAD PAINT POISONING CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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