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SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION.

The Second Department determined defendant school did not owe a duty of care to a student who was struck by a car one block from the school after leaving the school with permission:

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A school’s duty to supervise the students in its charge arises from its physical custody and control over them … . “When that custody ceases because the child has passed out of the orbit of its authority in such a way that the parent is perfectly free to reassume control over the child’s protection, the school’s custodial duty also ceases”… . “Generally, a school cannot be held liable for injuries that occur off school property and beyond the orbit of its authority” … .

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the infant plaintiff had left school grounds with the permission of his mother and, thus, was no longer in the defendants’ custody or under their control and was outside the orbit of their authority … . The defendants also demonstrated, prima facie, that the infant plaintiff was not released into a foreseeably hazardous setting that the defendants had a hand in creating … . Donofrio v Rockville Ctr. Union Free Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 02774, 2nd Dept 4-12-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION)/NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SCHOOL OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO STUDENT STRUCK BY A CAR AFTER LEAVING THE SCHOOL WITH PERMISSION)

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