You are here: / / LANDLORD (SUBLESSOR) DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE TO...
, ,

LANDLORD (SUBLESSOR) DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE TO PREVENT A MENTALLY ILL TENANT FROM SMOKING IN THE APARTMENT WHERE A FIRE STARTED.

The Second Department determined defendant nonprofit did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff’s subrogee for the actions of a tenant which apparently started a fire in the tenant’s apartment. Defendant nonprofit leased apartments to tenants suffering from mental illness. The tenants lived independently with little supervision:

Under limited circumstances, the relationship between a lessor and a lessee can give rise to a duty of care inasmuch as the lessor “must exercise reasonable care not to expose third persons to an unreasonable risk of harm” … . … [T]he relevant inquiry [is] whether the defendant, as sublessor, exposed the plaintiff’s insured in this case to an unreasonable risk of harm. Moreover, in evaluating the existence and scope of the duty of care, we are mindful that where, as here, the action involves only property damage, “the public policies, factors, and other analytical considerations used in setting the orbit of duty are different from those at play in cases involving physical injury” … .

Under the circumstances presented, the defendant established, prima facie, that it owed no duty to the plaintiff’s insured to take affirmative steps to prevent the tenant from smoking in the demised premises … . The evidence showed, inter alia, that all participants in the defendant’s housing program had to be able to live independently, and the degree of oversight provided by the defendant under the terms of its agreement with the tenant was limited. …

“[I]n the absence of fault or a specific contract provision to the contrary, neither the landlord nor the tenant is obligated to perform repairs after a fire” … . Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the breach of contract cause of action by showing that the subject lease did not impose an obligation on it to repair the premises after a fire … , or to answer in damages for a fire caused by its sublessee … . Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Hands Across Long Is., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02082, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (LANDLORD DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE TO PREVENT A MENTALLY ILL TENANT FROM SMOKING IN THE APARTMENT WHERE A FIRE STARTED)/INSURANCE LAW (LANDLORD DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE TO PREVENT A MENTALLY ILL TENANT FROM SMOKING IN THE APARTMENT WHERE A FIRE STARTED)/LANDLORD-TENANT (LANDLORD DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE TO PREVENT A MENTALLY ILL TENANT FROM SMOKING IN THE APARTMENT WHERE A FIRE STARTED)

You might also like
DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE ANSWER DESPITE THE FAILURE TO MAKE A PRE-ANSWER MOTION TO DISMISS; THE DEFENDANT GETS A SECOND CHANCE TO ADD AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IF THE COURT GRANT’S LEAVE TO AMEND (SECOND DEPT). ​
FAMILY COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE TWO CHILDREN IN ITS PLACEMENT DECISION; STRONG TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (SECOND DEPT).
THE TOWN’S SEQRA NEGATIVE DECLARATION REGARDING THE EXPANSION OF A CAMPGROUND WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS; THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TOWN AND THE CAMPGROUND CONSTITUTED ILLEGAL CONTRACT ZONING (SECOND DEPT).
CONFIRMED BANKRUPTCY PLAN DID NOT HAVE A RES JUDICATA EFFECT ON AN ACTION ON A MORTGAGE WHICH WAS PENDING WHEN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS WERE COMMENCED.
PETITIONER WAS ISSUED A PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT COMMERCIAL SPACE WITH 557 PARKING SPACES; THE PERMIT WAS REVOKED BECAUSE THE TOWN CODE REQUIRED 624 PARKING SPACES; BECAUSE THE PERMIT WAS INVALID, PETITIONER COULD NOT INVOKE THE “DOCTRINE OF VESTED RIGHTS” FOR A VARIANCE ALLOWING 557 SPACES (SECOND DEPARTMENT).
THE THREE-DAY FACT-FINDING HEARING RELATED TO THE NEGLECT PETITION RE: SERENA, NOT THE NEWLY-FILED DERIVATIVE NEGLECT PETITION RE: VINCENT; FAMILY COURT IMPROPERLY CONSOLIDATED THE TWO PETITIONS FOR THE DISPOSITIONAL HEARING DEPRIVING MOTHER OF DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF, A TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WAS WALKING IN THE STREET WHEN DEFENDANT STRUCK HIM AFTER TAKING HIS EYES OFF THE ROAD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTOR NOT LIABLE FOR SLIP AND FALL ON ICE, NO EVIDENCE CONTRACTOR CREATED OR EXACERBATED ICY CONDITION; FAILURE TO APPLY SALT NOT ENOUGH.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

LEASE PROVISION ALLOWING THE COLLECTION OF RENT AFTER EVICTION BY SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS... PLAINTIFF INJURED IN COLLSION WITH A POLICE CAR, POLICE REPORT PROVIDED CITY...