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TILTING A SKID FROM A VERTICAL POSITION ONTO A DOLLY IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SAFETY DEVICE WAS REQUIRED.

The First Department determined Labor Law 240(1) applied to the task of tilting a skid from a vertical position to a dolly.  However, there was a question of fact whether the skid was heavy enough to require a safety device:

Plaintiff was injured when he and a coworker attempted to move a wooden skid from a vertical position onto an A-frame dolly by tilting it at a 45-degree angle on one corner and toppling it onto the dolly. While plaintiff hoisted his side of the skid overhead with his arms, his coworker apparently lost his grip, and the skid fell on plaintiff, causing tears in his arm and shoulder.

That plaintiff and the skid were on the same level does not bar application of Labor Law § 240(1) … .

However, contrary to plaintiff’s argument, a triable issue of fact exists as to the weight of the skid and, therefore, whether a safety device was required under the statute. Natoli v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 01818, 1st Dept 3-15-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (TILTING A SKID FROM A VERTICAL POSITION ONTO A DOLLY IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SAFETY DEVICE WAS REQUIRED)

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NOTICE OF DISCLAIMER SENT TO PLAINTIFF’S INSURER WAS NOT EFFECTIVE NOTICE... PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION,...