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REAR DRIVER MUST TAKE WEATHER CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN FOLLOWING ANOTHER CAR, PLANTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE.

The First Department determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end collision case was properly granted. The driver of the rear vehicle must take weather conditions into account when following another car. The emergency doctrine is not available because the driver was aware of the weather conditions. An allegation that the plaintiff’s car stopped suddenly is not enough to rebut the presumption of negligence:

A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle, and imposes a duty on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle to come forward with an adequate, nonnegligent explanation for the accident … . Plaintiff made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability by establishing that defendant Angel Sanchez, the driver of defendant Basics Development Group’s vehicle, was negligent.

Although plaintiff came to a sudden stop and defendants contend that icy road conditions that day provide a valid, non-negligent explanation for why the accident occurred (i.e., that Sanchez’s car skidded), a driver is expected to maintain enough distance between himself and cars ahead of him so as to avoid collisions with stopped vehicles, taking into account weather and road conditions … . Furthermore, defendants’ reliance on the emergency doctrine is misplaced, since that defense is unavailable where, as here, defendant driver was aware of inclement weather conditions and should have properly accounted for them … .

Defendants’ alternative argument, that plaintiff stopped suddenly, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of Sanchez’s negligence … . Matos v Sanchez, 2017 NY Slip Op 01306, 1st Dept 2-21-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (REAR DRIVER MUST TAKE WEATHER CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN FOLLOWING ANOTHER CAR, PLANTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (REAR-END COLLISIONS, REAR DRIVER MUST TAKE WEATHER CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN FOLLOWING ANOTHER CAR, PLANTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE)/REAR-END COLLISIONS (REAR DRIVER MUST TAKE WEATHER CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN FOLLOWING ANOTHER CAR, PLANTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE)

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