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ETHICAL VIOLATION CANNOT BE USED AS A SWORD TO AVOID PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEE; BECAUSE TRIAL PREPARATION NOT NECESSARY, LOWER ATTORNEY’S-FEE PERCENTAGE APPLIED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined the fee arrangement contracts between plaintiff's attorney, Menkes, and two attorneys Menkes contracted with for assistance, Manheimer and Golomb, should be enforced according to standard prinicples of contract interpretation. Menkes argued that Manheimer was not entitled to payment because the clients were never informed (by Menkes) of Manheimer's involvement (an ethical violation). Golomb argued he was entitled to 40% of the fees because the matter did not settle at the mediation session. The Court of Appeals determined the 40% term only applied if it became necessary to prepare for trial (the case settled before trial preparation):

Menkes's attempt to use the ethical rules as a sword to render unenforceable, as between the two attorneys, the agreements with Manheimer that she herself drafted is unavailing. Her failure to inform her clients of Manheimer's retention, while a serious ethical violation, does not allow her to avoid otherwise enforceable contracts under the circumstances of this case … . * * *

Here, the mediator and Golomb communicated in the days following the May 20 mediation session, with the mediator continuing to act as go-between. Ten days after the session, the mediator communicated the final $8 million offer, which Golomb accepted. Reading the agreement as a whole, the plain language of the agreement entitles Golomb to 12% of net attorneys' fees. Marin v Constitution Realty, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 01019, CtApp 2-9-17

ATTORNEYS (FEES, ETHICAL VIOLATION CANNOT BE USED AS A SWORD TO AVOID PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEE, BECAUSE TRIAL PREPARATION NOT NECESSARY, LOWER ATTORNEY'S-FEE PERCENTAGE APPLIED)/CONTRACT LAW (ATTORNEY'S FEES, ETHICAL VIOLATION CANNOT BE USED AS A SWORD TO AVOID PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEE, BECAUSE TRIAL PREPARATION NOT NECESSARY, LOWER ATTORNEY'S-FEE PERCENTAGE APPLIED)

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