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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WORK ON AIR CONDITIONER WAS REPAIR COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1).

The First Department determined there was a question of fact whether plaintiff was performing routine maintenance or repair of an air conditioner. Routine maintenance would not support a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action, while repair would:

Issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff was performing routine maintenance, which would not implicate the protections of Labor Law § 240(1), or a repair within the meaning of the statute … , when he diagnosed an air conditioning unit’s malfunction, and replaced a component part. Although plaintiff testified that the compressor contactor malfunctioned due to normal wear and tear … , making it a worn-out component in an otherwise operable air conditioning unit … , and that the entire replacement took only 20 minutes, he also stated that this is not a part that would ordinarily require inspection, adjustment or replacement, and that it generally lasts as long as the compressor and can last the life of the unit, indicating that it was not a recurring event, and that the component was not intended to have a limited life … . Roth v Lenox Terrace Assoc., 2017 NY Slip Op 00402, 1st Dept 1-19-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WORK ON AIR CONDITIONER WAS REPAIR COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1))/REPAIR (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WORK ON AIR CONDITIONER WAS REPAIR COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1))/MAINTENANCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WORK ON AIR CONDITIONER WAS REPAIR COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1))

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