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HOMEOWNER’S EXCEPTION TO LABOR LAW 240 (1) LIABILITY APPLIED, DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED FREEDOM FROM FAULT UNDER LABOR LAW 200.

The First Department determined the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) and Labor Law 200 causes of the action were properly granted. The plaintiff alleged defendants provided him with a defective ladder and debris where the ladder was placed created a dangerous condition. Defendants demonstrated the homeowner’s exception to Labor Law 240 (1) applied and, with respect to Labor Law 200, the defendants demonstrated they did not own the ladder and did not create and were not aware of the debris-related condition on the ground:

… [T]he defendants made a prima facie showing that they were entitled to the protection of the homeowner’s exemption [to Labor Law 240 (1) liability] by submitting evidence demonstrating that the work being performed directly related to the residential use of the cottage and that they did not direct or control the manner in which the plaintiff performed his work … . …

Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty of an owner or contractor to provide employees with a safe place to work … . “To be held liable under Labor Law § 200 for injuries arising from the manner in which work is performed, a defendant must have authority to exercise supervision and control over the work'” … . Where the plaintiff’s injuries arise not from the manner in which the work was performed, but from a dangerous condition on the premises, a defendant may be liable under Labor Law § 200 ” if it either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition'” … . Where, as here, an accident allegedly involves defects in both the premises and the equipment used at the work site, a defendant moving for summary judgment with respect to an alleged violation of Labor Law § 200 is obligated to address the proof applicable to both liability standards … . A defendant is entitled to summary judgment “only when the evidence exonerates it as a matter of law for all potential concurrent causes of the plaintiff’s accident and injury, and when no triable issue of fact is raised in opposition as to either relevant liability standard” … . Dasilva v Nussdorf, 2017 NY Slip Op 00288, 2nd Dept 1-18-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HOMEOWNER’S EXCEPTION TO LABOR LAW 240 (1) LIABILITY APPLIED, DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED FREEDOM FROM FAULT UNDER LABOR LAW 200)/HOMEOWNER’S EXCEPTION (LABOR LAW 240 (1), HOMEOWNER’S EXCEPTION TO LABOR LAW 240 (1) LIABILITY APPLIED)

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