You are here: / / QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED...
, ,

QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.

The Second Department determined defendant’s statements in connection with a murder charge were made in violation of his right to counsel. A new trial was ordered. At the time defendant was questioned about a robbery and a murder (the “gas station shooting”), he was represented on a marijuana charge. The robbery and murder occurred at different times and places, but defendant allegedly was the getaway driver for both. The trial court ruled the statements related to the robbery were made in violation of defendant’s right to counsel but the statements related to the murder were admissible. The Second Department noted that it is statutorily prohibited from revisiting the trial court’s suppression of the robbery statements. Since the Second Department concluded that the robbery and murder interrogations were necessarily intertwined, the murder statements should have been suppressed:

The Court of Appeals has recognized two categories of cases in which the attachment of counsel on one crime may preclude the police from interrogating a suspect on the subject of another crime. In People v Cohen (90 NY2d 632), the Court of Appeals stated that “where the two criminal matters are so closely related transactionally, or in space or time, that questioning on the unrepresented matter would all but inevitably elicit incriminating responses regarding the matter in which there had been an entry of counsel[,] . . . interrogation on the unrepresented crime is prohibited even in the absence of direct questioning regarding the crime on which counsel had appeared” … . With respect to the second category, the Court of Appeals has stated that “a statement may be subject to suppression where impermissible questioning on a represented charge was, when viewed as an integrated whole, not fairly separable from otherwise permissible questioning on the unrepresented matter and was, in fact, purposely exploited to aid in securing inculpatory admissions on the [unrepresented matter]” … . * * *

In light of the determination that the defendant’s right to counsel was violated when he was questioned with regard to the robbery charges, we further find that his right to counsel was violated by questioning on the factually interwoven homicide matter. Indeed, the robbery and the murder cases were so closely related that questioning about the gas station shooting “would all but inevitably elicit incriminating responses regarding” the robbery … . People v Henry, 2016 NY Slip Op 07676, 2nd Dept 11-16-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)

You might also like
COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT A TOWN POLICE OFFICER WHO WAS INJURED UNDERGOING A PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST AS A CANDIDATE FOR A COUNTY SWAT TEAM WAS A SPECIAL EMPLOYEE OF THE COUNTY SUCH THAT THE POLICE OFFICER’S ONLY REMEDY WAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (SECOND DEPT).
Children’s Out-Of-Court Statements May Corroborate One Another
PLAINTIFF SUED DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS ALLEGING INACCURATE ADVICE CAUSED HER TO FILE FOR BANKRUPTCY, BECAUSE THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION ACCRUED WHEN PLAINTIFF FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY, THE LAWSUIT BECAME PART OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE AND PLAINTIFF WAS THEREBY STRIPPED OF THE CAPACITY TO SUE (SECOND DEPT).
THE COURT’S FAILURE TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT ON ONE INDICTMENT REQUIRED THAT THE DEFENDANT BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS TO THAT INDICTMENT AND ANOTHER INDICTMENT FROM WHICH NO APPEAL HAD BEEN TAKEN (SECOND DEPT).
BANK’S MOTION TO CHANGE THE CAPTION IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE NOTE TO A NEW PLAINTIFF, AND NO PROCEDURAL STEPS TO REMOVE A DECEASED DEFENDANT FROM THE ACTION WERE TAKEN (SECOND DEPT).
HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION TO LABOR LAW 241(6) APPLIED, NO EVIDENCE HOMEOWNERS SUPERVISED PLAINTIFF’S WORK, HOMEOWNERS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Doctrine of Practical Location Re: Boundary Line Dispute Explained
Bank Properly Sanctioned for Not Negotiating in Good Faith in Mandatory Foreclosure Settlement Conferences

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

CONTRACTUALLY SHORTENED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ENFORCED. COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED INDICTMENT ON GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT...