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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE PROCEEDINGS; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined defendant had been wrongly informed by his attorney that he was subject to consecutive sentences, and therefore defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the People presented evidence that, because of the horrendous nature of the crime, there was no possibility defendant would have been offered a plea bargain. Therefore the erroneous advice could not have affected the proceedings. Defendant’s motion to set aside his conviction was properly denied:

… [D]efendant was required to show more than incorrect advice by defense counsel. Here, the record supports the Appellate Division’s determination that there was no possibility that a reduced plea would have been offered to defendant. Therefore, the incorrect advice could not have affected the outcome of the proceedings. The People entertained no plea possibility or any reduction in the sentence given, among other things, the maximum sentence defendant faced for killing two adults and injuring a third was an aggregate term of just 5 to 15 years. Nor was there any proof that the court would have extended an offer to a reduced sentence. Rather, the sentencing court remarked that it did not think the maximum sentence was enough punishment for defendant under the circumstances of this case. People v Bank, 2016 NY Slip Op 07110, CtApp 11-1-16

CRIMINAL LAW (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE PROCEEDINGS; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE PROCEEDINGS; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE PROCEEDINGS; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED)

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