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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S LETTER REQUESTING A PLEA-BARGAIN CONFERENCE WAS NOT A WAIVER OF DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS.

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant’s motion to dismiss the marijuana-related indictments should have been granted on speedy trial grounds. The Fourth Department found that defense counsel’s letter asking for a discussion of a plea bargain could not be construed as a waiver of defendant’s speedy trial rights:

Defense counsel did not explicitly state or even suggest in his letter that he was waiving his client’s rights to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30; instead, counsel merely requested an opportunity to discuss a plea bargain before the District Attorney presented the case to the grand jury. In our view, that request does not constitute an explicit and “unambiguous” waiver of defendant’s speedy trial rights … , and we thus conclude that “the People failed to meet their burden of proving that the disputed . . . period was not chargeable to them” … . People v Leubner, 2016 NY Slip Op 06569, 4th Dept 10-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENSE COUNSEL’S LETTER REQUESTING A PLEA-BARGAIN CONFERENCE WAS NOT A WAIVER OF DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS)/SPEEDY TRIAL (DEFENSE COUNSEL’S LETTER REQUESTING A PLEA-BARGAIN CONFERENCE WAS NOT A WAIVER OF DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS)

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