STATEMENTS BY SHOOTING VICTIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS DYING DECLARATIONS BECAUSE THEY REFLECTED SPECULATION, NOT FACTS; WHETHER STATEMENTS ARE DYING DECLARATIONS IS NOT A JURY QUESTION.
The First Department, reversing defendants’ convictions, determined statements made by the shooting victim should not have been admitted as dying declarations because the statements reflected speculation, not facts. Whether the statements were admissible as dying declarations was not a question of fact for the jury. The defendants were not present at the shooting. The prosecution was based upon the theory the defendants hired the shooter:
… [W]e reverse the judgments and order a new trial because the court erred in admitting, as dying declarations, the victim’s statements implicating defendants, since they were his “mere expression of belief and suspici[ons]” that defendants were involved in his shooting rather than “statements of facts to which a living witness would have been permitted to testify, if placed upon the stand” … . Although the dying declarant may accuse his or her killer in conclusory language, “[t]he declaration is kept out if the setting of the occasion satisfies the judge, or in reason ought to satisfy him [or her], that the speaker is giving expression to suspicion or conjecture, and not to known facts” … .
… Contrary to the People’s argument, the question of what the victim was referring to when he implicated these defendants was not a proper jury question, nor did the lack of specificity merely go to the weight to be accorded this evidence.
The admission of the statements, which was over defendants’ timely and specific objection, was not harmless. Although some facts that may have led the victim to suspect that defendants were involved in his murder were part of the trial evidence, there was nothing to prevent the jury from speculating that the victim was privy to other information, outside the record, connecting defendants to the crime. We also note that the jury, which issued several deadlock notes during its very lengthy deliberations, twice requested to hear the dying declaration evidence. People v Gumbs, 2016 NY Slip Op 06424, 1st Dept 10-4-16
CRIMINAL LAW (STATEMENTS BY SHOOTING VICTIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS DYING DECLARATIONS BECAUSE THEY REFLECTED SPECULATION, NOT FACTS; WHETHER STATEMENTS ARE DYING DECLARATIONS IS NOT A JURY QUESTION)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, STATEMENTS BY SHOOTING VICTIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS DYING DECLARATIONS BECAUSE THEY REFLECTED SPECULATION, NOT FACTS; WHETHER STATEMENTS ARE DYING DECLARATIONS IS NOT A JURY QUESTION)/DYING DECLARATIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, (STATEMENTS BY SHOOTING VICTIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS DYING DECLARATIONS BECAUSE THEY REFLECTED SPECULATION, NOT FACTS; WHETHER STATEMENTS ARE DYING DECLARATIONS IS NOT A JURY QUESTION)