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SCRAP METAL SALES OPERATION WAS NOT A TRANSFER STATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COUNTY SOLID WASTE LAW.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Cohen, determined a scrap metal seller was not operating a “transfer station” within the meaning of the Westchester County Solid Waste Law. Therefore, certain fines and license fees related to the operation of a transfer station should not have been imposed by the county. The Second Department noted that, in reviewing an Article 78 proceeding, as long as the underlying statute does not require expertise to interpret, the reviewing court has the power to determine the meaning of the controlling statute. Here the plain meaning of the statute would not support defining the scrap metal sales operation as a transfer station:

The petitioner, Universal Metal & Ore, Inc. (hereinafter Universal), is an international metal trading company founded in 1951, which maintains a facility in Mount Vernon. Essentially, Universal is in the business of purchasing scrap metal, and reselling it at a profit to other companies. The primary issue raised on appeal is whether Universal’s Mount Vernon facility, where Universal accepts deliveries of scrap metal from independent dealers and stores it pending transport, may be considered a solid waste “transfer station” under the Westchester County Solid Waste and Recyclables Collection Licensing Law (hereinafter the Solid Waste Law). … [W]e conclude that Universal’s facility is not a transfer station as defined by the Solid Waste Law, and that there was thus no rational basis for the Westchester County Solid Waste Commission’s determination to fine Universal for operating a transfer station without a license. Matter of Universal Metal & Ore, Inc. v Westchester County Solid Waste Commn., 2016 NY Slip Op 06091, 2nd Dept 9-21-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (SCRAP METAL SALES OPERATION WAS NOT A TRANSFER STATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COUNTY SOLID WASTE LAW)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (SOLID WASTE LAW, SCRAP METAL SALES OPERATION WAS NOT A TRANSFER STATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COUNTY SOLID WASTE LAW)/SOLID WASTE LAW (SCRAP METAL SALES OPERATION WAS NOT A TRANSFER STATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COUNTY SOLID WASTE LAW)/SCRAP METAL (SCRAP METAL SALES OPERATION WAS NOT A TRANSFER STATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COUNTY SOLID WASTE LAW)

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