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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM “INSURANCE” IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined the word “insurance” in a noncompete agreement was susceptible of two meanings, thereby precluding summary judgment. Defendant signed a noncompete agreement which prohibited the “brokering or placement of insurance.” After plaintiff started a new job during the time-period covered by the noncompete agreement with his previous employer, he brokered two “surety bonds” for two companies which had been clients of his former employer. Plaintiff argued the term “insurance” encompassed “surety bonds.” Defendants argued the term “insurance” did not encompass “surety bonds:”

… [T]the evidence produced by each side does not show that the interpretation urged by each is inevitable; rather, it shows that the language of the letter agreement is “on its face . . . reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation” … . Accordingly, the motion court properly denied the motions for summary judgment. Frenkel Benefits, LLC v Mallory, 2016 NY Slip Op 06109, 1st Dept 9-21-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM INSURANCE IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS)/CONTRACT LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM INSURANCE IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS)/NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM INSURANCE IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS)/SURETY BONDS (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM INSURANCE IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM INSURANCE IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS)

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