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INSURER NOT LIABLE FOR POLLUTION DAMAGE DURING PERIODS WHEN POLLUTION INSURANCE WAS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, reversing Supreme Court, determined the insurer (Century) of plaintiff gas company (Keyspan) was not liable for pollution damage for periods of time which preceded the 16 years the policy was in place and during which pollution insurance was prohibited by law:

New York appellate courts … have not expressly ruled on the question presented here, which is: When the reason for the period of no insurance is that the insured could not have obtained insurance even if it had wanted to, is the risk attendant to the unavailability of insurance in the marketplace allocable to the existing, triggered insurance policies or to the insured? * * *

… [T]he order of the Supreme Court … which … denied defendant Century Indemnity Company’s motion for partial summary judgment declaring that Century is not responsible for any part of the costs of cleanup for periods of time when insurance was unavailable before 1953 and after 1986, should be unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted, and it should be so declared. Keyspan Gas E. Corp. v Munich Reins. Am., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 05945, 1st Dept 9-1-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (INSURER NOT LIABLE FOR POLLUTION DAMAGE DURING PERIODS WHEN POLLUTION INSURANCE WAS PROHIBITED BY LAW)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (POLLUTION INSURANCE, INSURER NOT LIABLE FOR POLLUTION DAMAGE DURING PERIODS WHEN POLLUTION INSURANCE WAS PROHIBITED BY LAW)/POLLUTION INSURANCE (INSURER NOT LIABLE FOR POLLUTION DAMAGE DURING PERIODS WHEN POLLUTION INSURANCE WAS PROHIBITED BY LAW)

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SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD. IN ORDER TO BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT FINDING DEFENDANT LIABLE IN AN ACCIDENT...