You are here: / / FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER...

FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the guardianship petition should not have been denied solely because the petitioner did not comply with the order requiring the fingerprinting of petitioner as part of a criminal background check. Family Court did not have the authority to require fingerprinting:

Contrary to the Family Court’s determination, there is no express statutory fingerprinting requirement in a proceeding such as this pursuant to Family Court Act § 661(a) for “[g]uardianship of the person of a minor or infant” … . Consequently, it was improper for the Family Court to dismiss the petition based solely on the petitioner’s failure to comply with a directive to obtain fingerprinting… . Matter of Silvia N. P. L. v Jorge M. N. P., 2016 NY Slip Op 05567, 2nd Dept 7-20-16

 

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING)/GUARDIANSHIP (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING)/FINGERPRINTING (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING)

You might also like
THE LOBBY WAS MOPPED WITH A SOAP-LIKE SUBSTANCE AN HOUR BEFORE PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL AND PLAINTIFF TESTIFIED SHE NOTICED THE FLOOR WAS WET AND SMELLED OF CLEANING FLUID AFTER SHE FELL; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT BUILDING OWNER CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).
EXCESSIVE FORCE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST POLICE AND 42 USC 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE MUNICIPALITY PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE TO A FORECLOSURE ACTION IS WAIVED IF NOT ASSERTED IN THE ANSWER OR A PRE-ANSWER MOTION TO DISMISS, IT MAY BE ADDED TO AN ANSWER AMENDED BY LEAVE OF COURT (SECOND DEPT).
MANUFACTURER AND SELLER OF THE PRODUCT WHICH ALLEGEDLY INJURED INFANT PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUE THE PARENTS FOR CONTRIBUTION ON A THEORY OF NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF THE INFANT (SECOND DEPT).
THE PERSON WHO ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF WAS THE OWNER OF THE LAW FIRM PLAINTIFF WORKED FOR; PLAINTIFF COULD RECOVER WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FROM THE LAW FIRM AND DAMAGES FOR ASSAULT AND BATTERY FROM THE OWNER, WHO WAS A COEMPLOYEE (SECOND DEPT).
THE FLOOR IN THE BATHROOM WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL HAD RECENTLY BEEN MOPPED; THE DEFENDANT GROCERY STORE DID NOT PROVE THERE WAS AN ADEQUATE WARNING; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS KILLED WHEN THROWN FROM A RENTED MOPED; THE RENTAL AGREEMENT INCLUDED AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE; THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION ARE SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE; HOWEVER, THE WRONGFUL DEATH CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE; NEGLIGENCE AND WRONGFUL-DEATH CAUSES OF ACTION ARE DISTINCT AND ADDRESS DIFFERENT INJURIES; THE WINNING ISSUE WAS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).
AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

CLAIM FOR A DE FACTO TAKING ACCRUES WHEN THE TAKING IS FIRST APPARENT, NOT WHEN... WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY...