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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SKIER ACTED RECKLESSLY, THEREBY RENDERING THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE.

The First Department determined there was a question of fact whether plaintiff assumed the risk of being struck by defendant skier because defendant acted recklessly. Plaintiff was standing at the bottom of the ski slope when defendant collided with her:

Plaintiff snowboarder was injured when, while standing at the base of a beginner ski slope and speaking with a friend, defendant struck her while skiing at approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Although there are inherent risks in the sports of skiing and snowboarding, “participants do not consent to conduct that is reckless, intentional or so negligent as to create an unreasonably increased risk” … .

Here, the record presents triable issues as to whether defendant had engaged in reckless conduct as he skied into a crowded area at the base of a beginner’s slope, which was at or near a marked safety zone, and that he did so despite his awareness of his limited abilities to safely handle such speed under the snow surface conditions presented. Furthermore, in view of the significant injuries sustained by plaintiff, reasonable inferences may be drawn that she endured a violent collision, which raises an issue as to whether the speed at which defendant was skiing was reckless under the circumstances … . Horowitz v Chen, 2016 NY Slip Op 05335, 1st Dept 7-5-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SKIER ACTED RECKLESSLY, THEREBY RENDERING THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE)/ASSUMPTION OF RISK (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SKIER ACTED RECKLESSLY, THEREBY RENDERING THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE)/SKI ACCIDENT (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SKIER ACTED RECKLESSLY, THEREBY RENDERING THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE)

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