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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO REAR-END COLLISION.

The First Department determined a question of fact about the applicability of the emergency doctrine precluded summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this rear-end collision case. Plaintiff's car was stopped because of a flat tire. Defendant alleged he did not see plaintiff's car because his line of sight was blocked by a car in front which merged left just prior to the collision:

Although there is a presumption of liability based upon the rear-end collision (see Francisco v Schoepfer, 30 AD3d 275 [1st Dept 2006]), questions of fact exist as to whether the emergency doctrine applies so as to provide defendant with a reasonable excuse for the collision. Such issues include whether plaintiff's hazard lights were flashing, whether defendant maintained a safe distance behind the car driving in front of him, and whether under the circumstances defendant acted reasonably to avoid the collision … . Gonzalez v Marescot, 2016 NY Slip Op 04105, 1st Dept 5-26-16

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO REAR-END COLLISION)/REAR-END COLLISION (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO REAR-END COLLISION)/EMERGENCY DOCTRINE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO REAR-END COLLISION)

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