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PLAINTIFF’S ACT OF CLIMBING A FENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT FOR LOCKING PLAINTIFF INSIDE WORK SITE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should not have been awarded to defendant on a Labor Law 200 cause of action alleging a dangerous condition. Plaintiff was locked inside the work site (a stadium) and was injured when climbing over a six-foot fence. Supreme Court erred when it determined, as a matter of law, that plaintiff's act of climbing the fence was the sole proximate cause of the injury:

“Defendants are liable for all normal and foreseeable consequences of their acts,” and the plaintiffs “need not demonstrate that the precise manner in which the accident happened or the injuries occurred was foreseeable” … . “An intervening act constitutes a superseding cause sufficient to relieve a defendant of liability if it is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's conduct'” … . However, when the intervening act is a natural and foreseeable consequence of a circumstance created by the defendant, the causal nexus is not severed and liability will subsist … . Whether an act is foreseeable is generally for the trier of fact … . Summary judgment is appropriate “where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts” … . Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs … we find that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether [plaintiff's] act in scaling the fence was a natural and foreseeable response to a condition allegedly created by the defendant's negligence … . Niewojt v Nikko Constr. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 04030, 2nd Dept 5-25-16

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF'S ACT OF CLIMBING A FENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT FOR LOCKING PLAINTIFF INSIDE WORK SITE)/NEGLIGENCE (LABOR LAW 200, PLAINTIFF'S ACT OF CLIMBING A FENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT FOR LOCKING PLAINTIFF INSIDE WORK SITE)

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