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DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; POLICE DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE AND WERE ENTITLED TO BOTH QUALIFIED AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IMMUNITY.

The Second Department determined defendants' motion to set aside the plaintiff's verdict, in a case alleging use of excessive force by police officers, should have been granted. Plaintiff, who was mentally ill, punched a police officer who approached him and ran up some stairs. When the police attempted to restrain him, he and the officers fell down the stairs. The Second Department held the facts did not support a finding of excessive force. The court further held the officers did not clearly violate plaintiff's statutory or constitutional rights and were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. In addition, the Second Department found the officers were performing a discretionary, not ministerial function, and were therefore entitled to government function immunity, requiring dismissal of the negligence cause of action. On the topic of qualified immunity, the Second Department wrote:

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” … . While the doctrine does not require “a case directly on point, . . . existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate” … . The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established … . “This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition” … . “Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts” … . “This exacting standard gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments' by protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law'” … . Davila v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 03846, 2nd Dept 5-18-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (POLICE, DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; POLICE DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE AND WERE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IMMUNITY)/IMMUNITY (POLICE, DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; POLICE DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE AND WERE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IMMUNITY)/CIVIL RIGHTS (POLICE, EXCESSIVE FORCE, DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; POLICE DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE AND WERE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IMMUNITY)/QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (POLICE, DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; POLICE DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE AND WERE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IMMUNITY)/GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IMMUNITY (POLICE, DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; POLICE DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE AND WERE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IMMUNITY)/NEGLIGENCE (POLICE, DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; POLICE DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE AND WERE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IMMUNITY)

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