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DEFENSE WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO A PROHIBITED CONVERSATION BETWEEN A COURT OFFICER AND JURORS BY ASKING THAT DELIBERATIONS CONTINUE DESPITE THE CONVERSATION; THE CONVERSATION DID NOT CONSTITUTE A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR.

The Second Department determined the defense waived objection to a court officer's conversation with three jurors during deliberations. Defense counsel asked that the jurors be questioned about their ability to continue and, after the questioning, asked that the jury continue to deliberate. The Second Department further held the communication by the court officer did not constitute a mode of proceedings error which need not be preserved. The decision includes a clear explanation of the types of issues which can be raised in a Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 330.30 motion to set aside the verdict and the distinction between waiver and preservation:

Except when authorized by the court or when performing administerial duties with respect to the jurors, court officers may not communicate with jurors or permit any other person to do so (see CPL 310.10[1]…). In considering a motion to set aside a verdict pursuant to CPL 330.30(1), however, a trial court may only consider questions of law, not fact … . Moreover, a trial court may only consider claims of legal error under CPL 330.30(1) where those claims are preserved for appellate review … .

Waiver and preservation are separate concepts … , although they are often “inextricably intertwined” … . Waiver connotes the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right … . Where a defendant assents at trial to a court's decision, agrees with the court's determination, or requests that the court take the actions the court ultimately took, the defendant cannot, after the fact, claim the action constituted error … . People v Armstrong, 2016 NY Slip Op 02843, 2nd Dept 4-13-16


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