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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS AND WHETHER WRITINGS, INCLUDING AN EMAIL, SATISFIED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The Second Department, in a contract action, determined there were questions of fact precluding summary judgment in a contract action. The court explained the black letter law re: a “meeting of the minds” and writings, including emails, sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds:

 

” In determining whether the parties entered into a contractual agreement and what were its terms, it is necessary to look . . . to the objective manifestations of the intent of the parties as gathered by their expressed words and deeds'” … . While it is the responsibility of the court to interpret written instruments, where a finding of whether an intent to contract is dependent as well on other evidence from which differing inferences may be drawn, a question of fact arises … . Here, the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding whether there was a meeting of the minds sufficient to give rise to a binding and enforceable contract. …

To satisfy the statute of frauds, an agreement “need not be contained in one single document, but rather may be furnished by piecing together other, related writings” … . Further, all of the terms of the contract “must be set out in the various writings presented to the court, and at least one writing, the one establishing a contractual relationship between the parties, must bear the signature of the party to be charged” … . “An e-mail sent by a party, under which the sending party’s name is typed, can constitute a [signed] writing for [the] purposes of the statute of frauds” … . Here, the terms of the alleged agreement were set forth in various writings, including an email and an assignment signed by the plaintiff … . Agosta v Fast Sys. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 00699, 2nd Dept 2-3-16

 

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (QUESTIONS OF FACT RE: ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND PASSING FALSE INFORMATION TO THE PROSECUTOR PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF POLICE OFFICERS)/FALSE ARREST (QUESTIONS OF FACT RE: ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF POLICE OFFICERS)

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