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JUDGE PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISQUALIFY A JUROR WHO SAID SHE COULD NOT CONTINUE DELIBERATING BECAUSE SHE COULD NOT SEPARATE HER EMOTIONS FROM THE CASE.

The First Department, affirming defendant’s manslaughter conviction over an extensive dissent, determined the trial court properly refused to disqualify a juror after she stated she was not able to continue deliberating because she could not “separate [her] emotions from the case.” The First Department explained the criteria for disqualifying a juror as “grossly unqualified” and noted the juror ultimately agreed she would be able to determine what the facts were, on her own, and then apply the law:

 

After a juror is sworn in, the juror should be disqualified only “when it becomes obvious that [the] juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict” (CPL § 270.35[1]). The trial court properly concluded, based upon its observations of the juror and its interactions with her, that she was not grossly unqualified from continuing to serve (CPL § 270.35[1]…). Contrary to how the dissent characterizes the trial court’s interactions with the juror, the colloquy, consisting of some 10 transcribed pages, shows that the court patiently listened to the juror and tactfully asked her probing questions to determine whether, for some reason, she could not be impartial … . She was candid in her responses and forthright about her concerns. None of her concerns had to do with fear about her personal safety … , nor did she express any concerns about feeling coerced by her fellow jurors to vote in any particular way … . The juror never expressed an inability to deliberate fairly and render an impartial verdict, nor did she make any statements that could be taken as evidence of bias or sympathy either towards the deceased or the defendant that would have prevented her from deciding defendant’s guilt or innocence. The juror only said that she was having difficulty separating her emotions, not that she was incapable of deciding the facts or applying the law, or that she would disobey the court’s instructions. People v Spencer, 2016 NY Slip Op 00447, 1st Dept 1-26-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISQUALIFY A JUROR WHO STATED SHE COULD NOT DELIBERATE FURTHER BECAUSE SHE WAS EMOTIONALLY OVERWHELMED)/JURIES (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISQUALIFY A JUROR WHO STATED SHE COULD NOT DELIBERATE FURTHER BECAUSE SHE WAS EMOTIONALLY OVERWHELMED)/DISQUALIFICATION OF JUROR (COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISQUALIFY A JUROR WHO STATED SHE COULD NOT DELIBERATE FURTHER BECAUSE SHE WAS EMOTIONALLY OVERWHELMED)

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