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PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN AN ARTICLE 10 TRIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; A TRIABLE ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED CONCERNING PETITIONER’S ABILITY TO CONTROL HIS SEXUAL CONDUCT.

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, reversing Supreme Court, determined that petitioner-sex-offender’s motion for a directed verdict in an Article 10 trial should not have been granted. Petitioner had been deemed a dangerous sex offender and was committed to a secure facility. In the instant proceeding, petitioner sought release under a regimen of strict and intensive supervision and treatment. The state presented evidence petitioner had been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, paraphila otherwise specified, and cannabis dependence.  The majority concluded that the state’s expert, Dr. Prince, had presented sufficient additional evidence, including a history of defendant’s sexual behavior, his response to treatment, and the results of psychological tests, to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant had serious difficulty in controlling difficulty controlling his sexual conduct:

When coupled with the evidence of petitioner’s clear, well-defined cycle of offending that begins with becoming frustrated, the deficits in his recent treatment plan on that specific area, and his stagnating course of treatment, we conclude that Dr. Prince’s opinion and the supporting evidence, ” when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, [establish that petitioner is a] . . . dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment[, rather than a] dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case’ ” … . Thus, respondents submitted sufficient evidence that, if it is credited by the factfinder, would establish that petitioner has a condition, disease or disorder “that predisposes him . . . to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and that results in [petitioner] having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct” (§ 10.03 [i] …). Consequently, we conclude that, if the factfinder accepts that evidence, there is a “rational process by which the [factfinder] could find for [respondents] as against” petitioner … . Matter of Wright v State of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 09711, 4th Dept 12-31-15

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (TRIABLE QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PETITIONER HAD SERIOUS DIFFICULTY CONTROLLING SEXUAL CONDUCT)/SEX OFFENDERS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, TRIABLE QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PETITIONER HAD SERIOUS DIFFICULTY CONTROLLING SEXUAL CONDUCT)

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