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DESTRUCTION OF BLOOD EVIDENCE IN FLOODING CAUSED BY HURRICANE SANDY DID NOT WARRANT AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined that the destruction of blood evidence by Hurricane Sandy did not warrant an adverse inference jury instruction, despite the People’s failure to timely respond to the defense request for the evidence. The court determined that the adverse inference jury instruction is not triggered by a loss of evidence for which the People are blameless:

… [T]he Handy [20 NY3d 663] adverse inference charge is a penalty for destruction of evidence, not for mere tardiness in producing it. …  While we do not condone the People’s slowness in fulfilling their disclosure obligations in this case, the evidence in question was not lost as a foreseeable result of the passage of time, but as a consequence of a natural catastrophe that happened to occur just before this case went to trial. Moreover, the delay in production of the evidence here appears to be as much the fault of the defense as of the People. Even though the defense always knew that the case would rely on DNA evidence, defense counsel, after making a pro forma request to which the physical blood evidence would have been responsive, never took any steps before the hurricane, over a period of approximately two years, to enforce defendant’s right to production of that evidence. As previously noted, the physical evidence did not become a focus of the discussion among the court and counsel until after the hurricane had passed. …

We see no support in the record for the dissent’s position that the physical blood evidence from the crime scene was somehow material to the defense. As previously discussed, while the dissent correctly notes that the match of defendant’s DNA with the DNA in the crime scene evidence was “the lynchpin of the People’s case against defendant,” placing before the jury the physical blood evidence from the crime scene would not have told them anything about the accuracy of the DNA match. Indeed, this appears to have been the original conclusion of defense counsel, who, without ever having had an opportunity to examine the physical evidence, announced that he was “ready to go” to trial before he learned that such evidence was no longer [*4]available. Nothing but speculation supports the dissent’s unlikely supposition that the appearance of the physical blood evidence at trial might have told the jury anything about “the manner of its collection, storage or handling” at the time the State analyzed its DNA, three years before trial. The condition of the physical evidence after the State conducted its analysis is irrelevant, since defendant has never expressed any interest in conducting an independent DNA analysis. People v Austin, 2015 NY Slip Op 09372, 1st Dept 12-22-15

CRIMINAL LAW (DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE CAUSED BY HURRICANE SANDY, ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE NOT WARRANTED)/JURY INSTRUCTION (ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE NOT WARRANTED, EVIDENCE DESTROYED BY HURRICANE SANDY)/EVIDENCE (DESTRUCTION BY HURRICANE SANDY, ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE NOT WARRANTED)/ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION (NOT WARRANTED WHERE EVIDENCE DESTROYED BY HURRICANE SANDY)

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