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Defendant Implicitly Consented to a Mistrial on Two of Three Counts by Requesting a Partial Verdict

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the defendant, by requesting a partial verdict on the count on which the jury had reached a verdict, had consented to a mistrial on the two remaining counts and, therefore, had waived double jeopardy protection for those two counts:

After one juror was found unable to serve, defendant refused to substitute an alternate juror and requested a partial verdict on the one count on which the jury had indicated it had reached a verdict. The Appellate Division granted the [defendant’s] petition [prohibiting retrial] on the basis that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial and did not address the issue of consent. Because defendant implicitly consented to a mistrial on two of three counts by requesting a partial verdict and by saying nothing about the court’s plans for retrial … , we need not reach the issue of manifest necessity. Matter of Gentil v Margulis, 2015 NY Slip Op 08455, CtApp 11-19-15

 

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