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Pre-2008 Criteria for Adverse Possession Explained

Applying the law of adverse possession as it was in 2002 (the legislature changed the law in 2008), the Second Department determined plaintiffs had demonstrated they acquired land enclosed by a fence by adverse possession:

In 2008, the Legislature enacted changes to the adverse possession statutes … . Here, however, since title to the disputed property allegedly vested in the plaintiffs by adverse possession in 2002 at the latest, the law in effect prior to the amendments is applicable … . Accordingly, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that their possession was “(1) hostile and under a claim of right, (2) actual, (3) open and notorious, (4) exclusive, and (5) continuous for the statutory period of 10 years” … . Additionally, under the former version of RPAPL 522 that was in effect at the relevant time, the plaintiffs were required to establish that the disputed area was either “usually cultivated or improved” or “protected by a substantial inclosure” … . “Since adverse possession is disfavored as a means of gaining title to land, all elements of an adverse possession claim must be proved by clear and convincing evidence” … .

Here, the plaintiffs demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law declaring that they were the owners of the disputed property by adverse possession. They submitted evidence that the disputed property had been enclosed by fencing since at least 1992, and that both the plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest cultivated and maintained the lawn on their side of the fence until 2010, while the property on the defendant’s side of the fence was wooded and remained uncultivated. Warren v Carreras, 2015 NY Slip Op 07967, 2nd Dept 11-4-15

 

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