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Zoning Board Applied an Incorrect Definition of a Term in a Zoning Ordinance—Court Has the Power to Impose Its Own Interpretation as a Matter of Law

The Third Department determined that the town’s zoning board of appeals did not apply the correct definition of a “neighborhood place of worship” when it denied petitioner’s application to convert a day spa to a “mikvah” in an area zoned for “neighborhood places of worship.” Submitted papers demonstrated that immersion in the waters of a mikvah is a basic religious ritual for Orthodox Jews and involves the recitation of blessings or prayers. Because the matter necessitated the interpretation of the terms of a zoning ordinance, the court need not defer to the zoning board’s interpretation:

The parties agree that the term “neighborhood place of worship” is neither defined in the Town’s zoning law, nor does it appear elsewhere in the Town’s ordinances. The zoning law does provide, however, that “[w]ords not specifically defined shall have their ordinary dictionary meanings” (Town of Mamakating Zoning Code § 199-6 [A]). Thus, the pertinent inquiry distills to whether petitioner’s proposed mikvah comports with the dictionary definition of a neighborhood place of worship. Although courts will ordinarily defer to a zoning board’s interpretation of a local ordinance, when “the issue presented is one of pure legal interpretation of the underlying zoning law or ordinance, deference is not required” … . The issue posed is susceptible to resolution as a matter of law by interpretation of the ordinance terms. Matter of Winterton Props., LLC v Town of Mamakating Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2015 NY Slip Op 07734, 3rd Dept 10-221-5

 

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