You are here: / / Police Did Have Sufficient Suspicion to Justify Telling Defendant to Drop...
,

Police Did Have Sufficient Suspicion to Justify Telling Defendant to Drop a Bag He Was Holding—Suppression Should Have Been Granted

The First Department determined the police did not have a founded suspicion criminal activity was afoot when they directed defendant to drop a bag he was holding. Therefore defendant’s suppression motion should have been granted:

The police officers’ initial approach and their intrusion upon defendant’s freedom by directing that he drop the bag were unsupported by a founded suspicion that criminality was afoot necessary to the exercise of the common-law right to inquire … . The officers approached defendant based solely on their observation of him carrying a shopping bag or gift bag that seemed rigid. While one officer testified that, based on his experience, he thought it might be a “booster bag” used for shoplifting, he essentially described an ordinary shopping bag. Further, it was conceded that defendant was not free to leave at the time he was ordered to drop the bag and its use as a booster bag became apparent. Defendant’s innocuous behavior in walking in and out of a store with the bag and his ensuing behavior did not justify further interference to obtain explanatory information … . People v Ties, 2015 NY Slip Op 07753, 1st Dept 10-22-15

 

You might also like
ALLOWING IN EVIDENCE INTERNAL RULES WHICH IMPOSED A HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE THAN REQUIRED BY THE COMMON LAW WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
EPTL 2-1.13, Which Required that Certain Formula Clauses in Trusts and Wills Be Calculated as if Federal Estate Taxes Were Paid in 2010 (When the Tax Had Expired) , Did Not Apply to the Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts at Issue Here
PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGEDLY INCONSISTENT ACCOUNTS OF THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL CREATED A QUESTION OF FACT.
ALLOWING IN EVIDENCE DEFENDANT’S TEXT THAT HE MAY NEED MONEY FOR AN ATTORNEY WAS (HARMLESS) ERROR BECAUSE IT WAS AN INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO ASSERT A GRAVES AMENDMENT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (AVAILABLE TO THE LESSOR OF A VEHICLE); PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE LATENESS OF THE MOTION (FIRST DEPT). ​
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR DECLINING THE COURT’S OFFER TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IT COULD DEVIATE FROM THE ACQUIT-FIRST RULE AFTER THE JURY INDICATED IT HAD DEADLOCKED ON THE TOP COUNT (FIRST DEPT).
THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) APPLIES RETROACTIVELY; THE DEFENDANT MORTGAGE COMPANY IS ESTOPPED BY CPLR 213(4)(A) FROM ASSERTING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A FORECLOSURE HAS NOT EXPIRED; PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT SEEKING DISCHARGE AND CANCELLATION OF THE MORTGAGE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT CANNOT APPEAL THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS THE SORA RISK-LEVEL PROCEEDING; HE MUST FIRST BE ADJUDICATED BY THE SORA COURT AND MAY SUBSEQUENTLY APPEAL REQUESTING AN ANNULMENT (FIRST DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Multi-million Dollar Legal Malpractice Action Stemming from Commercial Mortgage-Backed... Hearsay Alone Will Not Support Revocation of Probation/Failure to Pay Restitution...