You are here: / / Mother Never Waived Her Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings–Denial...
,

Mother Never Waived Her Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings–Denial of Mother’s Petition for Custody Reversed

The Second Department determined that the denial of mother’s petition for custody (and the grant of father’s petition) must be reversed because mother was denied her right to counsel. Three attorneys assigned to represent mother had been relieved. Family Court refused to assign another attorney and told mother to hire an attorney or proceed pro se. Although Family Court informed mother of the dangers of representing herself, mother never formally waived her right to counsel. Mother represented herself in the custody proceedings:

The Family Court Act enumerates “[e]ach of the persons [who] has the right to the assistance of counsel” (Family Ct Act § 262[a]). One such person is “the parent of any child seeking custody . . . in any proceeding before the court in which the court has jurisdiction to determine such custody” (Family Ct Act § 262[a][v]…). “[A]n indigent party has a right to assigned counsel in a Family Court custody proceeding” … . Where, as here, an indigent party has a right to assigned counsel, “this entitlement does not encompass the right to counsel of one’s own choosing” … . An application by an indigent person for the assignment of new counsel may be granted only “upon [a] showing [of] good cause for a substitution” … . “Good cause determinations are necessarily case-specific and therefore fall within the discretion of the trial court” … . * * *

A party to a Family Court proceeding who has the right to be represented by counsel may only proceed without counsel if that party has validly waived his or her right to representation … . “To determine whether a party is validly waiving the statutory right to counsel, the Family Court must conduct a searching inquiry’ to ensure that the waiver is unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligent” … . “The deprivation of a party’s fundamental right to counsel in a custody or visitation proceeding is a denial of due process which requires reversal, regardless of the merits of the unrepresented party’s position” … .

Here, the record does not demonstrate that the mother waived her right to counsel … . Matter of Tarnai v Buchbinder, 2015 NY Slip Op 07671, 2nd Dept 10-21-15

 

You might also like
Sua Sponte Dismissal for Lack of Standing Improper—Defense Waived by Failure to Answer—Lack of Standing is Not a Jurisdictional Defect
PLAINTIFF NYC SANITATION WORKER STEPPED ON A LIVE POWER LINE AFTER HIS SUPERVISOR ALLEGEDLY TOLD HIM THE POWER WAS OFF; QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL DUTY OWED BY THE CITY DEFENDANTS TO THE PLAINTIFF; CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
MOTHER HAD FLED TO ARGENTINA WITH THE CHILD WHILE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING; FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED THE MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER’S PETITION SEEKING VISITATION ON THE GROUND SHE DID NOT HAVE STANDING; MATTER REMITTED FOR A BEST INTERESTS HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​
Religious Holidays in Teachers’ Collective Bargaining Agreement Violate the Establishment Clause 
STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE INVALIDATED, EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF CHANGED HER MIND BEFORE THE STIPULATION WAS FILED, NO EVIDENCE OF DURESS, FRAUD, MISTAKE, OVERREACHING (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, FOUND THAT A DEFENDANT WHO HAD NOT BEEN SERVED WAS A NECESSARY PARTY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION AGAINST OTHER DEFENDANTS ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION TO RENEW BASED UPON LAW OFFICE FAILURE PROPERLY GRANTED; CRITERIA FOR GRANTING A MOTION TO RENEW IS FLEXIBLE.
THE CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE SALARY PROMISED PLAINTIFF AT THE OUTSET WAS A MISTAKE WHICH HAD BEEN CORRECTED, THE CITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HER BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS UNDER AN “AT-WILL EMPLOYEE” THEORY WAS NOT APPLICABLE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Jury Should Have Been Instructed on Intoxication Where an Element of Some of... Parent’s Inability to Pay for Juvenile’s Education Does Not Constitute...