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Two-Hour Interval Did Not Return Defendant to Status of One Who Was Not Under the Influence of Unwarned Questioning—Subsequent Mirandized Statement Should Have Been Suppressed—Harmless Error Here However

The Second Department determined the two-hour interval between defendant’s unwarned statement and a mirandized statement did not save the mirandized statement from suppression. During the unwarned statement defendant agreed to make a subsequent videotaped statement (which was mirandized). During the two hours between the unwarned statement and the videotaped statement defendant the defendant was never returned to the status of one who was not under questioning. The error here (admitting the videotaped statement) was, however, deemed harmless:

“[W]here an improper, unwarned statement gives rise to a subsequent Mirandized statement as part of a single continuous chain of events’, there is inadequate assurance that the Miranda warnings were effective in protecting a defendant’s rights, and the warned statement must also be suppressed” … . In determining whether a subsequent statement made after Miranda warnings were given was part of a “single continuous chain of events,” the court considers various factors including “whether the same police personnel were present and involved in eliciting each statement; whether there was a change in the location or nature of the interrogation; the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation, such as the extent of the improper questioning; and whether, prior to the Miranda violation, defendant had indicated a willingness to speak to police” … . The purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether there was a “definite, pronounced break in questioning sufficient to return the defendant to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning” … .

Here, the statement made by the defendant during the pre-9 a.m. questioning, which the Supreme Court suppressed, and the second videotaped statement were part of a single continuous chain of events inasmuch as during the pre-9 a.m. questioning, Detective Rodriguez asked the defendant to make a further videotaped statement when he interrogated the defendant in violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, during the two-hour break, the defendant was never returned to the status of one who was not under the influence of questioning …, but was anticipating the arrival of the Assistant District Attorney to continue the interrogation. Moreover, Detective Rodriguez, who elicited the 10-to-15 minute statement the defendant made during the pre-9 a.m. questioning without having been again given his Miranda warnings, was present during the subsequent videotaped interrogation, and both interrogations were conducted in the same interview room … . Considering these factors and the nature and extent of the Miranda violation, we cannot conclude that there was a definite, pronounced break between the defendant’s first and second videotaped statements sufficient to return the defendant to the status of one who was not under the influence of questioning … . People v Rodriguez, 2015 NY Slip Op 07520, 2nd Dept 10-14-15

 

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