Criteria for the “Fiduciary Exception” to the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Context of a Derivative Action Explained

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, in a matter of first impression, developed analytical criteria for determining whether documents sought by the plaintiff major investor (NAMA) in defendant limited liability company (Alliance) (formed for a major real estate development project) were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The documents at issue are communications between the managers of defendant Alliance and their attorneys, defendant Greenberg.  Supreme Court held that the 3000 communications were not protected by attorney-client privilege pursuant to the “fiduciary exception” to the privilege (re: derivative actions) because the interests of the plaintiff were not adverse to Alliance. However, that finding was not based upon a review of the communications. The First Department determined each individual communication must be reviewed to find whether it evinces an adversarial relationship. If so, such “adversity” would be only one factor to weigh in concluding whether “good cause” exists to invoke the “fiduciary exception” to the privilege. The First Department adopted the reasoning of a Fifth Circuit case, Garner v Wolfinbarger, 430 Fed 1093, which sets out a list of factors to be applied in finding good cause to apply the fiduciary exception to the privilege. “Adversity” is but one of those factors:

In the corporate context, where a shareholder (or, as here, an investor in a company) brings suit against corporate management for breach of fiduciary duty or similar wrongdoing, courts have carved out a “fiduciary exception” to the privilege that otherwise attaches to communications between management and corporate counsel. * * *

In 1970, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit extended the fiduciary exception to the corporate environment in Garner v Wolfinbarger (430 F2d 1093 [5th Cir 1970], cert denied 401 US 974 [1971]), for the first time allowing shareholders to use the exception to pierce the corporate attorney-client privilege. The Garner court was persuaded by two English cases that “treat[ed] the relationship between shareholder and company as analogous to that between beneficiaries and trustees” (id. at 1102). Relying on those cases and the traditional crime-fraud and joint-representation exceptions for the proposition that the corporate attorney-client privilege is not absolute, the court summarized its reasoning in the following way:

“[W]here the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance” (id. at 1103-1104). * * *

While some factors in the Garner test are relevant to a determination of adversity, Garner did not create a categorical adversity limitation. Thus, adversity is not a threshold inquiry but a component of the broader good-cause inquiry. Moreover, of the Garner factors that pertain to adversity, some will indicate whether the parties are generally adverse, while others will require a review of the communications in dispute; the relevant factors may weigh against finding good cause to apply the fiduciary exception with respect to those communications that reveal adversity. Accordingly, a court may find that the party seeking disclosure has shown good cause to be given access to some communications but not others. NAMA Holdings, LLC v Greenberg Traurig LLP, 2015 NY Slip Op 07346, 1st Dept 10-8-15