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Rare Example of Sufficiently Pled Cause of Action for Prima Facie Tort—Elements of Tortious Interference with a Contract Outlined

The Second Department determined plaintiff had stated a cause of action for prima facie tort and tortious interference with a contract. The complaint alleged the defendant set up websites and organized public protests accusing plaintiff of child abuse and had communicated with plaintiff’s employer, causing plaintiff to be terminated without cause. The decision is noteworthy because it demonstrates the extreme nature of allegations deemed sufficient to support a prima facie tort cause of action. With respect to the tortious interference with contract cause of action, the court explained:

The elements of tortious interference with a contract are: “(1) the existence of a contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the contract; (3) defendant’s intentional inducement of the third party to breach or otherwise render performance impossible; and (4) damages to plaintiff” … . The amended complaint sufficiently sets forth a cause of action based on tortious interference with a contract, alleging, in pertinent part, that [defendant’s] intentional interference with the subject employment contract rendered performance impossible. Hersh v Cohen, 2015 NY Slip Op 06888, 2nd Dept 9-23-15

 

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