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Plaintiff Is a Retired Judge—Change of Venue Appropriate to Avoid Appearance of Impropriety

The Second Department determined defendants’ motion to change venue in a wrongful death action should have been granted. Plaintiff is a retired Supreme Court justice in the county where the action was brought. Change of venue was appropriate to avoid the appearance of impropriety:

A court, upon motion, may change the place of trial of an action where there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had in the proper county (see CPLR 510[2]). Generally, a motion for a change of venue is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court …, and the resolution of such an application will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of that discretion … .

To succeed on a motion to change venue pursuant to CPLR 510(2), the movant is required to produce admissible factual evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that an impartial trial cannot be obtained in the county where venue was properly placed … .

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court improvidently denied the defendants’ motion to change venue. Although he is now retired, the plaintiff’s tenure as a Justice of the Supreme Court, Queens County, supports a change of venue of the action from Queens County to Nassau County to “protect[ ] the court from even a possible appearance of impropriety” … . Lisa v Parikh, 2015 NY Slip Op 06897, 2nd Dept 9-23-15

 

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