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Where the State Is a Potential Joint Tortfeasor Which Cannot Be Joined In the Supreme Court Action with the Other Defendant (Because the State Must Be Sued in the Court of Claims), the Jury in the Supreme Court Trial Should Be Allowed, If Appropriate, to Apportion Damages Between the Defendant and the State

Plaintiff was injured when a tree limb fell and struck her car while she was driving on a state highway. Plaintiff sued both the defendant (the property owner) and the state. However, the state could be sued only in the Court of Claims, so two separate actions were brought against the two potential tortfeasors. The Third Department, in a case of first impression, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCarthy, over a partial dissent, determined that evidence of both the defendant’s and the state’s liability could be presented in the Supreme Court trial and the jury should, if appropriate, be allowed to apportion damages between the defendant and the state:

“Under CPLR article 16, a joint tortfeasor whose culpability is 50% or less is not jointly liable for all of [a] plaintiff’s noneconomic damages, but severally liable for its proportionate share” … . The provision was promulgated as a modification of the common-law theory of joint and several liability, the purpose of which was to “remedy the inequities created by joint and several liability on low-fault, ‘deep pocket’ defendants” … . However, where potential tortfeasors are not joined in an action, the culpability of a nonparty tortfeasor may be imposed upon the named defendant if the plaintiff can show that he or she is unable to obtain jurisdiction over the nonparty tortfeasor (see CPLR 1601 [1]). Here, plaintiffs do not face a jurisdictional limitation in impleading the State as a codefendant, but instead cannot do so due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity … . Plaintiffs’ only recourse against the State is to pursue an action in the Court of Claims (see Court of Claims Act §§ 8, 9). Likewise, if defendant is found liable in Supreme Court, it could seek indemnification from the State relative to its share of actual culpability as an additional claimant in the subsequent Court of Claims action … .

CPLR 1601 (1) is silent in regard to whether the State’s proportionate share of liability should be considered in calculating a defendant’s culpability in an action like the one at bar, and we have never decided the issue. * * *

Although we recognize the possibility of inconsistent verdicts as to the apportionment of fault in Supreme Court and in the Court of Claims, we note that this risk arises regardless of whether or not the jury is entitled to apportion liability between defendant and the State … . Given the statutory purpose of CPLR 1601 (1) to “limit[] a joint tortfeasor’s liability for noneconomic losses to its proportionate share, provided that it is 50% or less at fault” …, we find that juries in this scenario should be given the option to, if appropriate, apportion fault between defendant and the State. Artibee v Home Place Corp., 2015 NY Slip Op 06556, 3rd Dept 8-13-15

 

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