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Village Did Not Have Authority to Sell Village Land Dedicated to Public Use (Public Roads) to Satisfy Property Tax Liens

The Second Department determined the village did not have the authority under the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) to sell land dedicated to public use (dedicated public streets) to satisfy property tax liens:

… [W]hile RPTL [Real Property Tax Law] 995 allows a municipality to consent to the sale of property to satisfy a tax lien, not all property owned by a municipality is freely alienable. As relevant here, a municipality holds the fee of dedicated public streets in trust for the public …, and may not convey such a fee unless there is specific legislative authorization permitting it, or the parcel’s use as a dedicated public street has been discontinued… .

RPTL 995 did not provide the Village with that specific authorization. The statute only authorizes petitions to collect “validly levied or charged” taxes (RPTL 995). Since the Legislature limited the application of the statute in that way, it did not contemplate that municipally owned property held for public use, which is exempted from taxation by RPTL 406(1), would be subject to an enforcement proceeding under RPTL 995, or that such property would be sold by a municipality at public auction in reliance on section 995, in satisfaction of a claim for such taxes (see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 222). Contrary to the Village’s contention, Village Law § 1-102 likewise did not provide the specific authorization necessary for the Village to sell a dedicated public road. Matter of AJM Capital II, LLC v Incorporated Vil. of Muttontown, 2015 NY Slip Op 06335, 2nd Dept 7-29-15

 

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