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Preventing a Party from Carrying Out Its Agreement Constitutes a Material Breach

The Third Department determined Supreme Court properly held that defendants breached the contract. Plaintiff owned a business which produced and sold aggregate stone. Plaintiff entered a lease agreement with defendants which allowed plaintiff to remove stone from a quarry on defendants’ property and required that defendants pay “rent” based upon the amount of stone removed. No stone was removed for some time. Defendants sent a letter indicating they would consider the lease null and void unless plaintiff started up the business within 90 days. The parties then entered discussions, some stone was removed and rent was paid. Thereafter, the defendants unilaterally declared the lease null and void, ordered plaintiff to remove its equipment, and prevented plaintiff from entering the property. Supreme Court found plaintiff had done enough to comply with defendants’ initial demand that plaintiff start up its business and, therefore, defendants’ actions, which prevented plaintiff from carrying out its agreement, constituted a material breach. The Third Department agreed:

“In the case of every contract there is an implied undertaking on the part of each party that he [or she] will not intentionally and purposely do anything to prevent the other party from carrying out the agreement on his [or her] part” … . In the April 1996 letter, [defendant] advised [plaintiff]  that the lease was null and void, threatened legal action if plaintiff did not “promptly” remove its equipment from the quarry, and stated that [defendant] did not consider himself bound by the lease because it was void. Two months later, defendants’ counsel advised plaintiff’s counsel that it was defendants’ position that the lease had been rescinded and that plaintiff “ha[d] no right to enter upon the property.” … “[R]efusing to permit the other party to perform is a breach of contract” … . Here, defendants’ unilateral declaration that the lease was null and void, and their threat of legal action if plaintiff did not promptly remove its equipment, followed shortly thereafter by the statement of defendants’ counsel that plaintiff had no right to enter the property, constituted a refusal to permit plaintiff to perform. Galusha & Sons, LLC v Champlain Stone, Ltd, 2015 NY Slip Op 06286, 3rd Dept 7-23-15

 

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