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Conversion of Water to Steam and Steam to Water Did Not Constitute a Manufacturing Process—Therefore Petitioner Was Not Entitled to Manufacturing Tax Credits in Connection with the Operation of Its “Boiling Water” Nuclear Power Facilities—The Certification Prerequisite for Pollution Tax Credits Is Not Preempted by Federal Law which Regulates the Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Facilities

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined that petitioner, the owner of two nuclear power plants, was not entitled to manufacturing tax credits or pollution tax credits under the Tax Law. The production of electricity is specifically excluded from the range of “manufacturing” for which manufacturing credits are available. The petitioner argued that the water which is turned into steam and then back into water (to operate the turbines) constituted a manufacturing process within the meaning of the Tax Law. The Third Department disagreed, describing the process as recycling, not manufacturing. The pollution tax credits are available only to facilities certified by the Department of Environmental Conservation as compliant with state environmental, public health and sanitary rules. Petitioner’s facilities were not so certified. The Third Department determined that the state certification requirement was not preempted by federal law, which exclusively regulates the construction and operation of nuclear power facilities, because tax credits do not regulate the construction or operation of such facilities. Petitioner was not, therefore, entitled to pollution tax credits. With regard to the manufacturing tax credits, the court explained:

Manufacturing is defined as “the process of working raw materials into wares suitable for use or which gives new shapes, new quality or new combinations to matter which already has gone through some artificial process by the use of machinery . . . and other similar equipment” (Tax Law former § 210 [12] [b] [ii] [A]), and “‘processing’ speaks to an industrial activity related to manufacturing” … . Here, the water that is converted to steam by petitioner’s assets is then converted back to its original form as water and then to steam again in an ongoing, continuous cycle that makes no permanent change in the water and yields no final product. This is more akin to recycling than to manufacturing. On these facts, we cannot find it irrational for the Tribunal to conclude that the claimed assets were not principally engaged in producing any tangible property other than electricity … . Petitioner has neither established that its interpretation of the governing statute is the only reasonable construction nor that the Tribunal’s interpretation was “irrational or unreasonable”…  and, thus, has not shown that the Tribunal’s determination that it is ineligible for the manufacturing tax credits should be reversed.  Matter of Constellation Nuclear Power Plants LLC v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 2015 NY Slip Op 06183, 3rd Dept 7-16-15

 

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