You are here: / / Substantial Evidence Did Not Support Maltreatment Report
, ,

Substantial Evidence Did Not Support Maltreatment Report

The Third Department determined the Commissioner of Children and Family Services should have granted the petition to expunge and amend as unfounded a maltreatment report maintained by the Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment. Although the denial could properly be based upon hearsay and double hearsay, the maltreatment finding was not based upon substantial evidence:

To establish maltreatment, the agency was required to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the physical, mental or emotional condition of the child had been impaired or was in imminent danger of becoming impaired because of a failure by petitioner to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child with appropriate supervision or guardianship … . Our review is limited to assessing whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence, meaning “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact”… .

Here, the proof introduced against petitioner consisted solely of the investigation progress notes and a Family Court order from 1998 that adjudicated petitioner to have neglected another son. The progress notes were prepared by a child protective services caseworker and include her accounts of interviews with numerous individuals, including the child and his therapist, that led her to the conclusion that maltreatment had occurred. Neither the caseworker nor her interview subjects testified before the Administrative Law Judge, however, and the progress notes reflect that the child bore no marks or evident injuries as a result of the maltreatment. In contrast to this meager evidentiary showing, petitioner and his wife both testified and denied that any maltreatment had occurred. Petitioner also asserted, without contradiction, that he was physically incapable of engaging in some of the claimed maltreatment, such as lifting the 110-pound child with one hand. His wife further stated that the child admitted to her that he was lying about the alleged maltreatment. The record suggests a reason why the child might be prompted to lie, as a bitter custody dispute between petitioner and the child’s mother has led to numerous unfounded reports of mistreatment regarding petitioner.

Like any administrative determination, one made after an expungement hearing may be based solely upon hearsay evidence — or even double hearsay evidence — in the appropriate case … . As such, “our concern is not the hearsay nature of the evidence, but whether it is sufficiently relevant and probative to constitute substantial evidence” … . Hearsay evidence will not satisfy that standard if the facts it purportedly establishes are “seriously controverted” … . Serious controversy is precisely what surrounds the hearsay evidence here, given the hearing testimony that the maltreatment had not occurred and that the child had recanted his claims, the proof that motivations may have existed for the child to fabricate the maltreatment, and the total lack of physical evidence suggesting that it occurred. We accordingly agree with petitioner that substantial evidence does not support the challenged determination, which must be annulled as a result … . Matter of Gerald HH. v Carrion, 2015 NY Slip Op 05982, 3rd Dept 7-9-15

 

You might also like
FATHER’S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY BASED PRIMARILY UPON INCREASED TRAVEL TIME BECAUSE OF MOTHER’S MOVE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE MAJORITY NOTED MANY REASONING ERRORS AND ORDERED A NEW HEARING IN FRONT OF A DIFFERENT JUDGE; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT) ​
THERE ARE TWO STATUTORY PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING AN EXTENSION OF A SEWER DISTRICT; HERE THE REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION WAS INITIATED UNDER ONE STATUTORY PROCEDURE, WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE A REFERENDUM, BUT THE TOWN APPLIED THE OTHER STATUTORY PROCEDURE, WHICH DOES REQUIRE A REFERENDUM; THAT WAS ERROR (THIRD DEPT).
LANDLORD ACCEPTED TENANT’S SURRENDER OF THE PREMISES BY OPERATION OF LAW, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.
Question of Fact About Whether Solar Panels Violate a Restrictive Covenant Precluded Dismissal of Complaint 
EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE SORA RISK-LEVEL ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING, HE DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL; COUNSEL DID NOT COMMUNICATE WITH DEFENDANT AND DID NOT PRESENT A DEFENSE; ORDER REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).
PARTY OBJECTING TO CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES’ NOMINATING PETITION DID NOT PROPERLY NOTIFY THE CANDIDATE OF THE OBJECTIONS, STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE INVALIDATED THE PETITION (THIRD DEPT).
UNUSUAL INCIDENT REPORTS, USE OF FORCE REPORTS, AND MISBEHAVIOR REPORTS KEPT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SERVICES (DOCCS) RE: INCIDENTS IN PRISONS ARE NOT PERSONNEL RECORDS PURSUANT TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 50-a, THEREFORE PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO UNREDACTED COPIES PURSUANT TO HIS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) REQUEST (THIRD DEPT).
FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO FATHER CONCERNING VISITATION AND SHOULD NOT HAVE INVOLVED MOTHER’S BOYFRIEND IN KEEPING FATHER INFORMED ABOUT MOTHER’S HEALTH (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Declaratory Judgment, Not Mandamus, Was Proper Vehicle for Determining Whether... Escaped Calf Furnished the Condition or Occasion for Plaintiff’s Decedent’s...