You are here: / / Parents of Children in Public Schools Had Standing to Seek Court Review...
,

Parents of Children in Public Schools Had Standing to Seek Court Review of the SUNY Trustees’ Authorization of Charter Schools—The Authorization Was Not Arbitrary or Capricious or an Abuse of Discretion

The Second Department determined parents of children in public schools had standing to bring an Article 78 petition for a review of the SUNY Trustee’s authorization for charter schools. The court determined the authorization was not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion, noting that there was no requirement of majority community support:

The petitioners, a group of parents of children in public schools in Community School District 14 and an organization they founded to oppose the subject charter schools, commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the SUNY Trustees’ determination authorizing the charters. The amended petition alleged that the SUNY Trustees authorized the charters in violation of Education Law §§ 2851(2)(q), 2852(9-a)(b)(ii), and 2852(2)(a), in that [the charter school organization] failed to demonstrate adequate community support, outreach, or input, and therefore, the charters should be voided. * * *

In authorizing the issuance of charters to the subject schools, the SUNY Trustees were required to find that the proposed schools met all requirements of the Charter School Act (see Education Law § 2852[2][a]). Given the representations and support therefor contained in [the] applications, the SUNY Trustees’ determination that [the charter school organization] met the statutory requirements with regard to evidence “of adequate community support for and interest in the charter school sufficient to allow the school to reach its anticipated enrollment” (Education Law § 2851[2][q]), and public outreach to solicit community input and address comments received from the impacted community concerning the educational and programmatic needs of students (see Education Law § 2852[9-a][b][ii]…), was, insofar as relevant here, not arbitrary and capricious. As the SUNY Trustees and the charter schools correctly contend, majority community support is not required by the Charter Schools Act (see Education Law § 2851[2][q]). Matter of Williamsburg & Greenpoint Parents: Our Pub. Schools! v Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y., 2015 NY Slip Op 05690, 2nd Dept 7-1-15

 

You might also like
Two Options to Recover on Note and Mortgage; One in Law (Note); One in Equity (Foreclosure)
THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FILE A CLAIM DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFY THE LOCATION OF THE SLIP AND FALL, RENDERING THE FILING OF THE CLAIM UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT).
THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT IN DISCOVERY WERE PROTECTED BY THE COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE, AN EXCEPTION TO THE USUAL RULE RE: WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (SECOND DEPT).
CRITERIA FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE A SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CPLR 306-b EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
TRIAL JUDGE ALLOWED THE PROSECUTOR TO QUESTION DEFENDANT ABOUT THE FACTS UNDERLYING PRIOR CONVICTIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE SANDOVAL RULING, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
Damages Related to Improvements Made on Condemned Property Allowed.
HERE THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (NYCHRL) BUT WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (NYSHRL) (SECOND DEPT).
TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED DEFENDANT COULD BE CROSS-EXAMINED ABOUT A PRIOR SIMILAR STABBING OF THE SAME VICTIM IF THE DEFENDANT CHOSE TO TESTIFY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

The Fact that Plaintiff’s Testimony Was the Only Evidence of the Defect... People Could Not Show Good Cause for the Nearly Five-Year Pre-Indictment Delay—Indictment...