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Parties’ Agreement to “Litigate” Their Entitlement to Interest on a judgment Did Not Constitute a Waiver of the Relevant Insurance Policy’s Arbitration Clause—The Arbitrability of the Claims Must Be Determined by the Arbitrator Not the Courts

The Fourth Department determined an agreement to litigate the parties’ entitlement to interest on a judgment did not constitute a waiver of the relevant insurance policy’s arbitration clause. The issue whether the parties’ claims are arbitrable, therefore, must be determined by the arbitrator, not the courts:

“Once the parties to a broad arbitration clause have made a valid choice of forum, as here, all questions with respect to the validity and effect of subsequent documents purporting to work a modification or termination of the substantive provisions of their original agreement are to be resolved by the arbitrator” … . This is not a situation in which the parties engaged in litigation to such an extent that they “manifested a preference clearly inconsistent with [a] later claim that the parties were obligated to settle their differences by arbitration’ ” … . Nor is this a situation in which the entire contract containing the arbitration provision has been cancelled or terminated, such that “the designation of the arbitration forum for the resolution of disputes is no longer binding upon the parties” … . We thus conclude that the determination of the arbitrability of the parties’ claims under the Policy should be made by an arbitrator. Town of Amherst v Granite State Ins. Co., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 05352, 4th Dept 6-19-15

 

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