You are here: / / Length of Probationary Term for New County Employees Is Arbitrable Under...
, ,

Length of Probationary Term for New County Employees Is Arbitrable Under the Two-Prong Test

Reversing Supreme Court, the Third Department determined the grievance concerning the length of the probationary period for new employees was arbitrable. The union contended the county had imposed a longer period of probation on a new employee than the 26 weeks allowed by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The county civil service commission, prior to the execution of the CBA, had adopted a resolution describing the period of probation for new employees as ranging from 8 to 52 to weeks. The Third Department determined there was no statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition to arbitration of the grievance. And the broad arbitration clause in the CBA covered the grievance at issue:

The threshold determination of whether a dispute is arbitrable is well settled. Proceeding with a two-part test, we first ask whether the parties may arbitrate the dispute by inquiring if there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance. If no prohibition exists, we then ask whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute by examining their collective bargaining agreement. If there is a prohibition, our inquiry ends and an arbitrator cannot act” … .

To be sure, “[w]hen a county civil service commission, possessing the requisite authority, promulgates a rule establishing the length of a probationary term of service, that rule has the effect of law”… , and the public employer and the union cannot negotiate a contrary provision in a CBA. Here, however, the CBA executed by the County and the Union long after the Commission modified the probationary term is not inconsistent with the new Commission rule, as the probationary term negotiated by the parties falls squarely within the range promulgated by the Commission. Therefore, we discern no statutory or public policy bar to arbitration of the grievance in the first instance … . Hence, we are satisfied that the parties may in fact arbitrate the underlying dispute. As to the second inquiry, i.e., whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate this particular dispute, we note that the parties’ CBA contains a broad arbitration clause, which encompasses “any claimed violation, misrepresentation or improper application” of the CBA. In light of such language, we similarly are persuaded that the Union’s grievance falls within the scope of disputes that the parties agreed to submit to arbitration … . Matter of County of Greene (Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Greene County Unit 7000, Greene County Local 820), 2015 NY Slip Op 04709, 3rd Dept 6-4-15

 

You might also like
CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT).
SUPREME COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION TO SERVE A 10-MONTHS-LATE ANSWER, CRITERIA EXPLAINED; IN ADDITION, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION AS TIME-BARRED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIIRD DEPT).
THE ROLLING LADDER LEFT IN THE AISLE OF DEFENDANT’S STORE WAS READILY OBVERSABLE, WHICH SPEAKS ONLY TO DEFENDANT’S DUTY TO WARN, NOT TO THE DUTY TO KEEP THE PREMISES SAFE; THE PROTRUDING BAR ON THE LADDER CREATED A POTENTIAL TRIPPING HAZARD; DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, INCLUDING EXPERT EVIDENCE, OF DEFENDANT’S INTOXICATION TO RAISE A DOUBT WHETHER DEFENDANT FORMULATED THE INTENT TO COMMIT ASSAULT SECOND; THE REQUEST FOR THE INTOXICATION JURY CHARGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE APPOINTED STANDBY COUNSEL AS DEFENDANT REQUESTED, THE JUDGE DID NOT CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY TO ENSURE DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THE RISKS OF REPRESENTING HIMSELF; GUILTY PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PURELY VICARIOUS, ATTORNEYS FOR BOTH THE HOSPITAL AND THE EMPLOYEE-PHYSICIAN WERE PROPERLY ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TRIAL, PLAINTIFFS’ MID-TRIAL REQUEST TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT).
Criteria for Unconstitutional Impairment of Contract Rights Explained in Context of Requirement that Health Insurers Reimburse Customers Pursuant to Public Health Law Section 4308
AGREEMENT TO FOREGO APPLYING FOR A REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION IN RETURN FOR THE TRANSFER OF TWO BUILDINGS FOR ONE DOLLAR WAS ENFORCEABLE.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) Did Not Have the Authority... Dismissal of a Summary Judgment Motion as “Premature” Requires an...