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Doctor Did Not Have a Duty to Disclose an Email from a Non-Physician Representative of the Implant Manufacturer Which Indicated Plaintiff Might Not Be a Good Candidate for the Implants

The First Department, over a dissent, determined summary judgment had been properly granted to the defendants in a medical malpractice action.  The court found that the doctor was not required to provide the plaintiff with an email from a non-physician representative of the implant manufacturer stating that plaintiff might not be an ideal candidate for the implant because the implants require “good tissue support:”

Plaintiff … failed to rebut defendants’ showing that she was properly informed of the surgical procedure and the alternatives, as well as the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits, by tendering expert testimony proving the insufficiency of the information … disclosed to her … .

There is no basis in the law for the dissent’s conclusion that [the doctor] had a duty to disclose to plaintiff the email from the manufacturer’s representative in response to her general query. The dissent mistakenly equates that representative’s conclusory email with a product’s written manufacturer warning or a consulting doctor’s opinion. Ramos v Weber, 2014 NY Slip Op 03943, 1st Dept 5-3-14

 

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